Feature: Platforms: the building blocks of cars

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by Jeremy Cato

HIROSHIMA, Japan – We are here in Mazda’s headquarters, standing in a warehouse-sized room shimmering in the blood-red lighting and bold wall coverings of a Las Vegas brothel. In front of us is a concept vehicle. As we look on, I turn to Joe Bakaj, Mazda’s managing director of research, development and design, to ask on which platform this concept is based.

“Platforms. I wish we’d never shared that word with you guys (journalists),” says Bakaj, showing just a hint of exasperation. “I could build this from any number of component sets,” he adds, waving his hand at the concept.

Yes, he could. In fact, the core engineering for the underlying platform of this concept has mostly been done for other vehicles. So if the public likes it and the company sees a market for the vehicle, Mazda could conceivably take the concept and make it showroom ready in 14-18 months.

Mazda has the ability to do this because there already exists a library of components for the parts and underlying build processes of the vehicle – the stuff customers simply do not see. That is the platform.

There is no question Mazda could pull off the job, though. Japan’s No. 5 automaker long has been known as a leader in getting cars to market quickly and for its manufacturing efficiencies. For consumers, that means what you see on an auto show stand today could be for sale in a matter of months, not years.

Indeed, Mazda, controlled by Ford Motor Co. with its 33.4 per cent interest, has proven skills in developing flexible platforms both for itself and in conjunction with its Ford partners. The current Mazda3 is a perfect example.

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It rides on the C1 Technologies platform, the core engineering of which was led by Mazda. Today, not only is the Mazda3 a C1-based sedan and four-door hatchback, but so also are the new European Ford Focus car and Focus C-Max compact minivan, and the Volvo S40 sedan and V50 wagon. Coming next summer and also based on the C1 is the Mazda5 compact van. All those vehicles, with the exception of the Mazda5, have been successfully launched in the past year or so, garnering positive reviews and strong sales.

The engineering alchemy here results in this: line them all up side-by-side and each one looks completely different from the other, even though what’s under the skin is largely shared. Also common for the most part is the build sequence required to put all the different pieces together on the assembly line.

Still, key differences between the various models – the so-called brand applications – were engineered by the three individual Ford subsidiaries. We are referring to the stuff that makes a Mazda a Mazda and a Volvo a Volvo. Nonetheless, the bulk of the core engineering for the underlying platform was done at Ford’s engineering center in Merkenich, Germany, near Cologne.

The C1 program marks the first time engineers from a range of Ford brands have worked so closely to develop a family of vehicles. It won’t be the last.

Late last year Mazda took over responsibility for a new generation of subcompact cars to be sold around the world, generating annual sales of up to one million by the end of the decade. Among the vehicles coming out of the project will be the next-generation Ford Fiesta, Fusion, Ka, Ikon and Ecostar, and the Mazda2.

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That decision came on the heels of Ford choosing to use the Mazda6 platform as the basis for as many as 10 Ford, Lincoln and Mercury models, totaling up to 800,000 annual units. Those vehicles include the North American Ford Fusion, the Lincoln Zephyr and Mercury Milan mid-size cars.

All three will share about 60 per cent of their parts by value with the Mazda6, though Ford plans to stretch the Mazda6 platform to create what it calls a new CD3 architecture, says Phil Martens, Ford group vice-president of product creation and the man who held Bakaj’s current job in Hiroshima before being promoted to the parent company in Dearborn, Mich.

Martens adds that the trio due next year will differ significantly not only in styling – each will have unique sheet metal – but also in interiors, suspension tuning and technical gadgetry.

The complexity of the program explains why Bakaj gets exasperated when journalists bandy about the term “platform” without appreciating its implications and subtleties. He argues the term platform is an over-simplification in that it creates the impression that everything under the skin is identical. Not so.

Bakaj and other Ford officials prefer to talk about sharing systems and technologies rather than sharing platforms. On that point, he is consistent with most other engineers, regardless of corporate stripe.

Mazda, of course, is not the only carmaker using a “platform strategy” to create a variety of models from the same set of underpinnings, all sharing as much as 60 to 70 per cent of the same parts.

Consider five different Toyota models: the Camry mid-size sedan, Sienna minivan, Highlander crossover vehicle, the Lexus RX 330 crossover and the Lexus ES 330 near-luxury sedan. All trace their roots to the bread-and-butter Camry, though to be fair they also draw parts from many other Toyota products from around the world.

It is a similar story for The Jaguar S-Type and Lincoln LS. They share a platform. So do the Volkswagen Passat and Audi A4; the Chrysler PT Cruiser and Neon; the Pontiac G6 and Chevrolet Malibu; the Honda Accord sedan and coupe and the Odyssey minivan; and, the Volkswagen Touareg and Porsche Cayenne. And the list goes on and on and on.

All of the world’s big automakers have put in place some version of a well-executed platform strategy. It allows them to create a whole portfolio of vehicles all of which share many expensive components such as engines, instrument panels and suspension parts.
Moreover, vehicles built on the same platform — those that share hard points — usually can be run down the same assembly line. From a manufacturing efficiency point of view, that’s definitely a good thing.

Companies best able to leverage their platform strategies are able to cut vehicle development times dramatically. They also benefit from large reductions in design, engineering and manufacturing costs.

For customers, the advent of advanced and extensive platform strategies has resulted in an explosion of vehicle models. According to research done by AutoPacific of Southern California, automakers are now selling a whopping 267 nameplates in the United States, with a similar number for sale in Canada.

AutoPacific says that while the number of nameplates in the marketplace has doubled in the past three decades, if trends continue there could be 300 nameplates out there by 2010. The term nameplate refers to the moniker a manufacturer designates for a particular vehicle. If one factors in body styles – e.g., wagon and coupe — the number of different model available at least doubles, perhaps even triples.

There is, however, a danger in the platform approach, one perfectly illustrated by a trap GM fell into in the mid-1980s and early 1990s. At that time GM employed a platform strategy that led to a range of mid-size cars so similar they became known as regrettable examples of badge engineering — same car, different model name.

Volkswagen AG, too, has been stung by certain negative consequences from its decision in the early 1990s to slice the number of global platforms to four from 16 by the end of the last decade. While VW achieved untold cost efficiencies from creating a huge range of Audi, SEAT and Skoda products riding on just four basic platforms, some European buyers found it less expensive to opt for technologically similar models from SEAT and Skoda, rather than buy a VW-brand vehicle.

In response, Europe’s biggest automaker several years ago began moving away from “platforms” to “component sets” or “modules” that include engines and transmission, brakes, axles and fuel system. The idea is to create more clearly differentiated vehicles from the various brands parented by VW.

In addition, VW has reorganized its brand structure to give a greater voice to the individual units – particularly Audi, its luxury brand and most profitable unit, and one which found itself at risk of being accused of selling re-badged Volkswagens. The goal now is to create highly differentiated models, taking advantage of component, design and build efficiencies wherever possible.

In this, Honda remains perhaps the world leader, along with Toyota. A key breakthrough for Honda came in 1997 when it introduced a “flexible” platform for the 1998 Accord. The actual genius behind this system remains murky, but it allows Honda to produce three versions of the Accord for North American, Japanese and European buyers.

Meanwhile, Toyota has said that when a massive wave of new models begins arriving in 2005, the company will have found ways in its platform and manufacturing approaches to save a staggering 30 per cent in development and manufacturing costs over the current generation of models.

Bakaj, the Mazda research and development boss, is not surprised by any of this. He says that while Mazda and other have made significant progress, no automaker has managed to achieve the total optimization of platforms on a global basis – and perhaps none ever will.

But as the automotive world continues to shrink in terms of significant global players, expect all the players, large and small, to keep refining their approaches to product development. Keep in mind that barely a handful of automakers control 80 per cent of global automotive production. These global giants are committed to strategies that call for fewer, more flexible, higher-volume platforms in order to leverage their size and purchasing power.

For consumers, the benefits are quite clear: an ever-increasing array of interesting and unique vehicles brought to market at affordable prices.

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